Abstract. In this paper we show that for any one-way function f , being able to determine any single bit in ax + b mod p for a random Ω(jxj)-bit prime p and random a; b with probability only slightly better than 50% is equivalent to inverting f (x).
Introduction
One of the most important questions in cryptography is the existence of so called oneway functions -functions easy to compute but hard to invert. It is natural to construct an encryption scheme from this primitive. Intuitively, finding the encrypted message would mean inverting the one-way function which in turn is presumed hard. One must be careful though, since even if the function is hard to invert, it may reveal partial information like: "The encrypted message starts with the text 'Fort Meade"', or less dramatic, "The message is an odd integer". This problem was noticed by Goldwasser and Micali, [5] , who also showed how to circumvent it based on certain assumptions.
However, we would like the assumptions to be as weak as possible, preferable we would like to use any one-way function f . Although we can never hope that f (x) itself will not leak any information about any bit in x, one could at least hope that some specific bits in x or in some simple function h(x) would remain hidden, given f (x) (or f (x) and the description of h in the second case). We want bits that given f (x) (and h) are unpredictable or "random looking" to any resource bounded adversary, resource bounded refering to computing time. Such bits/functions are called a hard core for f . This concept was studied by Blum and Micali in [3] and by Yao in [12] . For instance it was shown how to construct a pseudo-random generator, another important cryptographic primitive: Suppose the one-way function f is a permutation and that H is a set of boolean functions such that for random h 2 H, h(x) is unpredictable given f (x); h. Choose a random h, a random x 0 and output h(x 0 ). Update: x i+1 = f (x i ) and output h(x i ), i = 0; 1; : : :; m. Finally, output h. By the properties of f and H just discussed, one can hope that the sequence h(x 0 ); h(x 1 ); : : :; h(x m ); h will look random.
Where should we look for hard core functions? For efficiency reasons it should be as easy as possible to compute h(x). What first comes to mind is functions of the form: h(x) = "some bit in x", for instance h(x) = lsb(x). There are examples of certain f for which lsb(x) looks random given f (x). RSA-type functions has this property as shown by Alexi et al. in [1] , Vazirani and Vazirani in [11] and Blum et al. in [2] . Similar results for discrete exponentiation in different settings appeared in [3] by Blum and Micali, in [8] by Long and Wigderson and in [6] , Håstad et al. However, single bits in x may in general not be unpredictable. The simplest counterexample being lsb(x) with respect to f (x) = g x mod p, discrete exponentiation modulo a prime (a conjectured one-way function). Here, computing lsb(x) is merely a matter of determining quadratic residuosity for f (x) . Since the most attractive situation is when our hard core bits are hard core for any one-way function f , we need more complex functions than single bits in x but which are still easy enough to compute. One soon also realizes that we can not hope that some fixed function will work for any f . However, we can hope that choosing a random function h in some fixed set of functions, H, will do the job. Other questions raised are: If h 2 H maps n bits to m bits, are all m bits in h(x) individually hard core? Can certain subsets of the bits be used simultaneously?
The first general and efficient construction of a hard core function was done by Goldreich and Levin in [4] . They showed that any one-way function has a hard core bit obtained as the inner product modulo 2 of x and a random string r. Two more types of functions, (i) affine functions on a finite field of characteristic 2 and (ii) the analogue on the field of integers modulo a (not too short) prime p, were shown by Näslund in [10] to have the same property. In case (i), it was also shown that any single of the n bits in the function value is hard core for any one-way function. Here we extend the results from [10] to show that essentially all individual bits in the type-(ii) functions are also unpredictable.
In general, to show that some H is hard core for f , one shows that an algorithm, O, for predicting h(x) for random h 2 H can be transformed into an inverting algorithm for f . Roughly speaking, O is used to determine the bits in x (or some simple, invertible function of x) one by one. Also, the bits are generally decided in order left to right or vice versa. The main technical novelty in this paper is a new method whereby the bits are determined two by two. The bits are not even adjacent, one of the two is the bit to the left of that predicted by O and the other is, at least in principle, the least significant bit. There are some cases where we during a short initial phase are only able to determine the first of the two bits. However, during this phase the latter bit has no importance and after a short delay we will be able to determine both the bits. We hope that the ideas behind this method will get further use or inspire others to develop methods applicable to show similar results for other types of functions.
The paper is organized as follows: After giving some notation in Section 2 and reviewing some previous work in Section 3, we give a general proof outline in Section 4. We then discuss the hardness of internal, but non leftmost bits in Section 5 and Section 6 extends the techniques to the leftmost bits. Due to space constraints, most proofs can only be sketched here.
Preliminaries
The model of computation used is that of probabilistic Turing machines running in time poly(n) where n is the length of the input, pptm's for short. In general, jyj denotes the length of the binary string y. If S is a set, jSj is the cardinality of S and by x 2 U S we mean an x chosen uniformly at random from S.
We call a function g(n) negligible if for every constant c > 0 and for every sufficiently large n, g(n) < n ?c . A one-way function is a poly-time computable function f such that for every pptm, M, the probability that M( f (x)) 2 f ?1 (x) is negligible. The probability is taken over x 2 U f0; 1g n and M's random coin flips. For simplicity all one-way functions in this paper are assumed to be length-preserving, i.e. j f (x)j = jxj. By simple padding arguments, it can be seen that this is no serious restriction. Let H be an efficiently sampleable family of functions where each h 2 H is computable in deterministic polynomial time and maps f0; 1g n 7 ! f0; 1g m , m n and let f be a one-way function. An ε(n)-oracle for H is a pptm O such that Pr O( f (x); h) = h(x)] 2 ?m + ε(n), the probability taken over x 2 U f0; 1g n , h 2 U H and O's random choices. We call H a hard core function for f if no ε(n)-oracle exists for non-negligible ε(n). (When m = 1 we have a hard core predicate.)
For p 2 Zand z 2 Z p , bit i (z) denotes the ith bit of z. In particular bit 0 (z) = lsb(z).
For 0 i j < jpj, let z] j i denote bits i; i + 1; : : :; j in the binary representation of z.
If H is a family of functions, we will write bit i (H) when referring to the family fbit i (h(x)) j h 2 Hg.
For k > 0, let P k denote the set of primes of length n=k. Here, n = jxj, the security parameter of some one-way function f . The set of functions we study is
Note that the probability space when choosing h 2 U H k 2 is that of all triples (p; a; b) with p 2 U P k and a; b 2 U Z p . However, assuming the existence of an ε(n)-oracle for bit i (H k 2 ), simple counting arguments allow us to study a set of ps of density ε(n)=2 in P k for which our oracle will be successful with probability 1=2 + ε(n)=2 taken over and that only the msb can have bias greater than 1=6. The bias is significant only for the O(logn) most significant (leftmost) bits so we divide the paper into two main parts: The internal (non leftmost) and the leftmost bits.
Previous Work
In [10] it was shown that an n ?c -oracle for lsb(H k 2 ) could be used to retrieve x mod p with good probability. Repeating this for different p, Chinese remaindering was applied to find x.
To find x mod p basically the following method was used: Assume the existence of a "very good" oracle for the lsb. Having determined the lsb of ax + b mod p we zero it by subtracting: b 0 = b ? lsb. Computing 2 ?1 (ax + b 0 ) mod p will then give us the rest of the bits in ax + b mod p shifted one step to the right. Continue this process to extract all the bits in ax + b mod p. With a; b; p known, x is easily found.
The very good oracle in turn was constructed using the two point based sampling technique from [1] and a majority decision. This could be done if ax + b mod p was "small" (zeros in the msbs) to avoid wraparound modulo p (i.e. reduction by p) when adding sample points. Actually a polynomial number of oracles had to be constructed with at least one of them being good. All the oracles were then tried. It was also noted that the methods used applies for bit i (H k 2 ) with i 2 O(logn), since the bits to the right of the oracle could be put to zero with non-negligible probability.
Proof Outline
The method summarized above does not work with Ω(n) bits to the right initially undetermined. Suppose we have an oracle for bit i (H k 2 ), i 2 Ω(n). Here we decide the bits two by two; bit i + 1 and another bit. In principle, we would like the latter bit to be the lsb, but as will be seen this is sometimes too optimistic. There will sometimes be a short initial phase during which we can only determine bit i + 1, but on the other hand, the lsb can be shown to be unimportant during this phase. After this phase, the lsb (actually what was the lsb some iterations ago) will start to matter but this will also imply that we can start to determine it. To begin with, let us for simplicity ignore any possible problem and for a second let us assume that we can determine bit i + 1 and the lsb. Having 
Now, assume the prime p looks like
and p 3 is "small". We get
Since p 3 is small, the term (p 3 + 1)=2 will only affect the rightmost bits (with high probability). The term p 1 2 i+1 will only affect bits to the left of the oracle, assuming no extra wraparound occurs when the msbs in p are added to the msbs in rx+s. Now, since we know the value w above, we know if wraparound occurs in which case we subtract (p ? 1)=2 in a similar way. So it would seem that wraparound is no serious concern but in fact this is what sometimes prevents us from determining the lsb. Nevertheless, let us again ignore this and push the problems ahead somewhat. Thus the important difference in this case is that we by (1) and ( 
Knowing z and determining z 0 thus gives some information about the two unknown bits in ax + b. We immediately see that we can not allow jp 2 ? 2 d j to be small since the effect of bit i+1 (ax + b mod p) = 1 would be the same as if lsb(ax + b mod p) = 1. We will later make precise what should be demanded from p 2 (or actually from p 2 =2 d+1 ). Section 5.2 gives a generalization of the two point based sampling from [1] to get values of the type rx+s mod p with known z-values. How do we determine the z 0 -value after the shift?
Observation 4.1. Let J; J 0 be equal-length subintervals to f0; 1; : : : ; 2 d+1 ? 1g, at dis-
their left endpoints are
D apart, modulo 2 d+1 and we write J 0 = J + D). Then by (3) , with high probability:
If the fraction of 1-answers the oracle gives on J differs non-negligible from that on J 0 , we can distinguish this by sampling. Thus, we need four interval pairs: 
(We will later need "two-dimensional" intervals to take care of the wraparound problem. Nevertheless the intuition is the same and the above notation simplifies the layout of the ideas.) We will in Section 5.1, 5.3 discuss the properties needed from the prime p and use this in Section 5.4 to show existence of, and how to find the intervals.
With the general idea described, let us return to the wraparound problem. A close look will show that depending on whether rx + s mod p p=2 or not and whether lsb(ax + b) is zero or one, we always have one of two possibilities for the value we query the oracle on: (1) It is smaller than p=2 and lies in some interval J, or: (2) It is greater than p=2 and lies in the interval J + p 2 . Hence, we can not argue that we have random points in J and J + p 2 . For instance the oracle might be correct only on y 2 Z p such that bit i (y) = bit i (y + bp=2c) and otherwise behave randomly.
All is not lost though, since this means that the lsb-value has virtually no effect on the oracle's behaviour and the information we get is precisely the value of the (i + 1)th bit. We therefore simply neglect the lsb, determine bit i + 1 and zero it and shift ax + b to the right. We don't know the lsb that went out to the right, but by assumption, the oracle behaves independently of that bit. What happens on the next attempted shift? We now add roughly 2 d bit i+2
to the value in the sample point in Equation (3). (To be correct, bp=4c should be replaced by 2 ?2 mod p, but these numbers are basically the same.) We can ignore the term p 2 bit 1 (ax + b) since it (by assumption) has no effect on the oracle. Now, either the term bp=4c] i i?d lsb(ax + b) influences the oracle or it doesn't. If it does, we can now determine the lsb delayed by one step and in the future, all bits to the left of it delayed one step too. On the other hand, if not even bp=4c] i i?d lsb(ax + b) has any effect, we can ignore this term too and just determine bit i + 2.
If this should go on, we will get more and more "spooky" bits that moves out to the right but as long as their effect is negligible, we can determine the bit to the left of the oracle in each step. But this can not go on for ever! We claim that after a small O(logn) delay during which the spooky bits are of no importance, we can start to determine them: If we after τ shifts still have no non-negligible advantage in determining the lsb, this means that most of our oracle's advantage is for y 2 Z p such that most of
are equal. (Actually, the values fb j p=2 τ c j j = 1; : : : ; 2 τ ? 1g is a permutation of values close to f j2 ?τ mod p j j = 1; : : : ; 2 τ ? 1g, which is what we actually want to study.)
Intuitively, if no small integer multiple of bp=2 τ c is close to any multiple of 2 i , this set of ys must be very small, contradicting our hypothesis on the oracle! The value τ above will be called a good shift.
Security of Non Leftmost Bits
Assume Definition 5.1. The rational number α, 0 α < 1 is said to be of (Q; ψ)-type if for all integers t; q, 0 t < q Q:
(That is, the distance from qα to the nearest integer is at least 
Definition 5.2. Let (α) N be a rational sequence and let J = a; b) be a subinterval of 0; 1) (allowing wrap around 1 by 1 0 (mod 1)). Define
i.e. the number of points in the sequence falling into J.
The discrepancy (deviation from uniform distribution) of (α) N is defined by
We will of course not actually deal with rational numbers, but rather integers. However, it is easy to see that the sequence ir mod s, i = 1; : : : ; N, will be as well distributed in Z s as the sequence (r=s) N is in 0; 1). Well known results state that if α is irrational then D((α) N ) ! 0 as N ! ∞, see [7] . We will later need a quantitative result for rational α.
5.2.
Generalizing the Two-point Based Sampling. As mentioned in the proof outline, we will need a set, P, of random sample points of the form rx + s mod p with bits i; i ? 1: : : : ; i ? O(logn) "known" beforehand, i.e. listed in a set L. To control wraparound, their O(logn) most significant bits must also be "known" as the values in a list M. To this end we will use a generalization from [10] of the two point based sampling technique introduced in [1] . We will get a polynomial number of candidates, f(L; M)g one (L; M)-pair being correct with high probability. 
for sufficiently large n). Finally, let τ(n) = dlogN(n)e. Assume p 2 P k , k > 0 and that p is of the form
where
and where
is such that
l(n) is of (2N (n); ψ(n))-type for j = 1; 2; : : : ; τ(n).
Then p is called a good prime. Call this set of good primes P 0 k and let H k 3 be as the set H k 2 , but with p restricted to P 0 k .
Note that p ( j)
2 corresponds to bits i; i ? 1; : : : ; i ? (d 1 + d 2 )dlog ne in bp=2 j c which is 2 ? j mod p and also that by the choice of c 0 c earlier, we always have τ(n) bit to the left of bit i. By only studying these bits, we will introduce a truncation error, but by choosing d 2 sufficiently large, this error can be controlled.
Lemma 5.3. The probability that a randomly chosen p 2 P k is good is 1?O(n ? (d 1 ?3 
) ).
Proof: By Definition 5.3 and Lemma 5.1, the probability that an n=k bit number is bad (regardless of primality) is at most 9τ(n) log
2 s is not of (2N (n); ψ(n))-type.) It is well known that the number of primes of length n=k is θ ; 2 τ(n)? j ) for 1 j τ(n).
1 Please note that this is a preliminary version and that some of the constants may possibly be improved and others may have to be increased. The good shift is the number of steps we may have to wait before we can start to determine (what was) the lsb. It is important that we choose the smallest possible τ 0 since we must be certain that the information we get for the τ 0 ?1 first shifts is precisely the (i + 1)th bit. This holds since the effect of the spooky bits is negligible for these first shifts. It is perhaps not obvious that a good shift exists or if it does, that we can keep on determining the (i + 1)th bit from the τ 0 th shift and on but we will shortly prove that this is the case.
To begin with, we have the following immediate consequence to our assumptions:
) and the bias of bit i is β i , then for
Put differently, and using our assumptions on the bias induced by the choice of the value c 0 c earlier: There is an interval J of length l(n)=2 satisfying ∆(J; J + π(2 i )) n ?c =2.
We omit the (simple) proof. The next lemma will show the existence of other, nontrivial, subintervals for which the fraction of 1-answers from the oracle also differ nonnegligible.
Lemma 5.5. Let p 2 P k 0 . There is an interval J in I Y of length at least 2 d 2 dlogne?2
where γ(n) is non-negligible.
Proof: See the appendix for a proof sketch.
It is not too hard to see that adding 2 i does not affect numbers of (2N (n); ψ(n))-type. 
are all at least γ(n). In particular, every (n ?c =2; p)-oracle for bit i (H k 3 ) has a good shift. 9 Since none of the p ( j) 2 s can be close to π(2 i ), there will be no trouble retrieving bit i+1 for the τ 0 ? 1 first shifts. Now that good intervals/shifts do exist, we will need to be able to find them.
Lemma 5.7. Given is T 2 poly(n) subintervals to I Y : J 1 ; J 2 ; : : : ; J T , each of length λ(n) 2 d 2 dlogne?2 . Then for any constants s;t > 0, it is possible to find a polynomial number of lists, fR ( j) j j = 1; 2; : : :g, each R ( j) indexed by the J l s such that for at least one j, for each l = 1; 2; : : : ; T:
Proof sketch: Use Lemma 5.2 to generate random points in Z p for which we "know" the intervals they belong to and query the oracle on these. Roughly γ(n) ?2 n
sample points are needed.
For the remainder of the paper, we will assume that the good shift is equal to one, i.e. that we can distinguish between values of the form z and z+bp=2c. Equivalently, we can assume that we have already shifted ax + b by τ 0 ? 1 steps to the right, determining and zeroed bit i + 1 at each step, and from now on want to determine both bit i + 1 and the lsb (or rather, what was the lsb τ 0 ? 1 iterations ago). 
Constructing a Good (bit i+1
and therefore, for v = 1; 2; 3; 4, with high probability:
Observe that by substituting suitable values in f0; 1g for b i+1 ; b 0 ,b i+1 ;b 0 , we recognize the four good interval pairs
For two equal-sized sets (intervals) J 0 = (I 0 ; y 0 ); J 00 = (I 00 ; y 00 ) define #(J 0 ; J 00 ) = 2(jI 0 j ? jI 0 \ I 00 j) if y 0 = y 00 and jI 0 j otherwise. (The size of the symmetric difference.)
The next lemma tells us how to distinguish between the two intervals in each pair, or rather, how to exclude one of the two as a possibility. The proof is a fairly simple application of Chebyshev's inequality and is therefore left out. The idea is that if we conclude that B R v (S) = 1 so that we believe the samples to be from J v + π(D v ), then with high probability, the hypothesisb i+1 ;b 0 as in Observation 5.1 must be wrong -we would otherwise have sampled in J v and should have By Observation 5.1 and assuming that Lemma 5.8 can be applied, it is easy to see that this will give us (bit i+1 ; lsb) if none of the three runs make an error in deciding the corresponding B R v (S). However, to apply Lemma 5.8 we must check that the conditions there are satisfied. irst we see that from Lemma 5.7, the probability of not having good approximations in R can be made as small as we wish. Next we must check that if (b i+1 ;b 0 ) is a correct hypothesis then all but O(1) of the samples will be taken in the J v we are aiming for. From this will also follow that if (b i+1 ;b 0 ) satisfies the relation: easy to show that the total error probability of (i), (ii), (iii) is less than 4m ?3=2 . Therefore, the probability that more than O(1) points end up outside is small. A calculation will show that all points are where we want them to be with probability at least 1 ? and so Lemma 5.8 can be applied. Hence, using the m points in S v (b) in Lemma 5.8, the probability that B R v (S v (b)) is correct is at least 1 ? 1 5tn and we follow the correct edge in the tree. The probability we follow the correct edges on all three runs is at least 1 ? 3 Let fx 0 g be the corresponding values for x mod p found for each of the above possibilities. For the correct choice of u, the "good" oracle O will determine bit i+1 ; lsb with probability at least The situation is now the same as in [10] : Apply Theorem 5.10 for many, say 10kn c ps. For all O(n ck ) k-subsets of the the ps and for each (of the polynomially many) modular equations obtained for each p, use Chinese remaindering to get a suggestion for x. We get a polynomial number of suggestions and with high probability at least one of them will be correct (verify against f (x)). Hence, as almost every p in P k also belongs to P 0 k : is a hard core predicate for any one-way function.
Security of the Leftmost Bits
We will now study the O(logn) most significant bits. If the bias of the ith bit now still is smaller than n ?c =4, we use the methods from the previous section. Otherwise the bit might not be hard core according to previous notation. So we use definitions introduced in [9] : Definition 6.1. Let H be a family of boolean functions having bias β < 1=2 and let O be a pptm. The quantity
the probability taken over h 2 U H, x 2 U f0; 1g n and the random choices of O, is called the weighted success ratio of O and is denoted by ws O (H; f ).
Let f be a function. Call H a hard core predicate for f if no O exists with ws O (H; f ) 2 + g(n) for non-negligible g.
A well known lemma, also from [9] , states that for an oracle with a non-negligible g(n) as above, the fraction of correct 1-answers must differ non-negligible from the fraction of erroneous 1-answers. Thus we can replace Lemma 5.4 by this generalization and all is set to prove Lemma 5.5 in the new setting. In fact, now only one pair of intervals is needed since only one bit, the lsb, is unknown at each instant. Theorem 6.1. Each of the O(logn) most significant bits in H k 2 is a hard core predicate for any one-way function.
Discussion and Open Problems
The simultaneous hardness of the internal bits remain open. The fact that we could show hardness for each individual bit was due to the new technique of determining the bits two by two. However, it seems that the fact that two bits have influence over what the oracle gets as input also makes it impossible to use the method to show simultaneous security in the general case. The natural approach, reducing to a next-bit test (see [12] ), doesn't seem to work as we do not know the bits close to the ith.
The reduction from the inversion of f (x) is polynomial time but of rather large degree. Is there a simpler, more security preserving reduction (a simpler proof)?
Finally, we ask if it would be possible to improve the results to allow for primes significantly shorter than Ω(n), say jpj = n 1?ε .
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Finally, let V be the distribution of Z = X + vW mod s. Then Z is within sD ((α) N tD;t)) is non-negligible we are done since this is precisely what we want. Can we be sure that there is such s; j;t? By assumption, D=l(n) is of (2N (n); ψ(n))-type. Therefore, by Lemma A.2, choosing a random t and a random point in I s j + tD, this will be close to the uniform distribution on f0; 1; : : : ; l(n) ? 1g = I. Now, we know that the average fraction of 1-answers the oracle gives on I 0 differs non-negligible from that on I 1 . On the other hand, the discussion above implies that each term of the form P 1 ((I 1 j + tD;t)) contributes (almost) as much to P 1 (I 1 ) as it does to P 1 (I 0 ). So if they are all the same, this would mean that P 1 (I 0 ) is close to P 1 (I 1 )! This also motivates why we can not hope that the first shift, τ = 1, will work. We then have just two copies of each I s j . There is no way we can argue that one of them is in I 1 and one in I 0 , they may very well both be in the same half.
